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No One Can Serve Two Masters:
Arguments Against Private Prosecutors
Matthew S. Nichols*
"The prosecuting attorney is the attorney for the state, and it is his
primary duty not to convict but to see that justice is done."'
"A lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the interests
of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf."2
"No one can serve two masters; for either he will hate the one and love
the other, or he will be devoted to the one and despise the other."3
L Introduction
In the early history of England the victim of a crime and his family had
the right to hire a private attorney to prosecute criminal charges against the
person alleged to have injured the victim." This right to employ a private
prosecutor was incorporated into the common law of Virginia.' The use of
a private prosecutor is still permitted in Virginia even though the Common-
* J.D. Candidate, May 2002, Washington & Lee University School of Law; B.A.,
McMurry University.
1. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 150 (1936).
2. VA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt. (2000).
3. Mattew 6:24 (New International Version).
4. JohnD. Bessler, 77ePubliclnteoutandthe UncontitutionalityofPrivateProsecutors,
47 ARK. L. REV. 511, 515 (1994) (discussing historical development of the private prosecutor).
5. See Cantrell v. Commonwealth 329 S.E.2d 22, 25 (Va. 1985) (discussing Supreme
Court of Virginia's understanding of the historical development of the private prosecutor).
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wealth provides public prosecutors in essentially all criminal prosecutions.'
While the private prosecutor allegedly occupied an important place in
criminal prosecutions at common law, the modern application of the private
prosecutor rule presents such a danger to the fair and impartial administra-
tion of justice that its application violates the protections guaranteed crimi-
nal defendants by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Consti-
tution and Article I, Section 11 of the Virginia Constitution."
The United States Supreme Court has found that the appointment as
special prosecutors of attorneys retained by parties with interests in the
outcome of a criminal case requires reversal of the defendant's conviction.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that a
conflict of interest on the part of the prosecutor violates the defendant's due
process rights and requires the reversal of the defendant's conviction.9 The
Supreme Court of Virginia has noted that public policy arguments may
support the abolition of the private prosecutor rule and has reversed convic-
tions obtained with the assistance of private prosecutors.'0 The Virginia
6. SeeVA. CODE ANN. S 15.2-1627.B (Michie 2000). The Virginia Code provides that:
The attorney for the Commonwealth and assistant attorney for the Common-
wealth shall be a part of the de. partment of law enforcement of the county or city
in which he is elected or appoiited, and shall have the duties and powers 
imposed
upon him by general law, mnudinc the duty of prosecutinz all warrants, indict-
ments or ninormations charging a e ony, and he may in his screton, prosecute
Class 1, 2 and 3 misdemeanors, or any other violation, the conviction of which
carries a penalty of confinement in jail, or a fine of $500 or more, or both such
confinement and fine.
Id.
7. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S 1. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.; see VA. CONST. art. I, S 11 (providing "[t]hat no person shall be deprived of his life,
liberty, or property without due process of law").
8. See Young v. United States ex. reL Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 807-13 (1987)
(holding that trial court has discretion to appoint attorney to prosecute contempt charges but
that it is impermissible for adverse party's attorney to prosecute criminal contempt charges
arising from related civil case); discussion infra Part IV.C.
9. See Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709, 714 (4th Cir. 1967) (holding that prosecutor's
simultaneous representation of the defendant's wife in divorce proceeding and prosecution
of defendant for assault on wife violates the requirement of fundamental fairness assured by
the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); discussion infra Part V.C.
10. See Cantre/l, 329 S.E.2d at 26-27 (stating that 'a conflict of interest on the part of
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General Assembly has restricted the participation of private attorneys in the
prosecution of criminal cases." However, interested parties continue to
convince Virginia trial court judges that privately retained attorneys can
participate in the impartial administration of justice without prejudice to
defendants. 2 The goals of these interested parties diverge from the obliga-
tions placed on the public prosecutor. Interested parties seek the conviction
of particular defendants through the private prosecutor's participation.
Conviction of a particular defendant often prepares the way for a subse-
quent, related civil suit in which the private prosecutor's client stands to
benefit. As long as private prosecutors are permitted to participate in the
prosecution of criminal cases, the private prosecutors' obligations to their
clients place the due process rights of criminal defendants at risk.
the prosecution in itself constitutes a denial of the defendant's due process rights under art.
I, S 11 of the Constitution of Virginia, and cannot be held harmless error"); discussion infra
Part IV.C. In Cantrell, the Supreme Court of Virginia favorably discussed the defendant's
argument that public policy supports abolishing the private prosecutor's role and held that
a private prosecutor
havingl[a] civil interest in [a] case so infects the crim;nal prosecution with the
possibilty that private vengeance has been substituted for .npartial application
of the criminal law, that prejudice to the defendant need not be shown. A
conflict of interest on the part of the prosecution in itself constitutes a denial of
a defendant's due rocess rights under art. I, S 11 of the Constitution of Virginia,
and cannot be herd harmless error.
Id.; see also Adkins v. Commonwealth, 492 S.E.2d 833, 834-35 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) (holding
that trial judge violated defendant's due process rights by appointing private prosecutor
retained by victim's family to act as special prosecutor after Commonwealth's Attorney
withdrew from the case); discussion infra Part IV.C.
11. See VA. CODE. ANN. S 19.2-155 (Michie 2000) (restricting the appointment of
special prosecutors to situations in which the attorney for the Commonwealth is disqualified
or disabled); discussion infra Part IV.D. '
12. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Riner, No. F00-265 (Va. Cir. Ct. Nov. 3, 2000) (unre-
ported). In October 2000, the Wise County Commonwealth's Attorney was assisted in the
prosecution of Charles Douglas Riner ("Riner') for capital murder, robbery, and arson, by
a private attorney paid by the family of Riner's deceased wife. Riner was accused of murder-
ing his wife, Denise Riner ("Denise"), in a house fire in August 1998. Denise's sister hired
Guy Harbert ("Harbert"), an attorney from the Roanoke firm of Gentry, Locke, Rakes &
Moore to assist in the prosecution. Harbert spearheaded the prosecution of Riner. The
private prosecutor made the Commonwealth's opening statement, argued most of the
Commonwealth's motions, objected to and argued against most of the defendant's motions,




. The conflict of interest inherent in criminal prosecutions conducted by
privately retained attorneys is clear. Equally dear is the responsibility of the
Supreme Court of Virginia and the Virginia General Assembly to protect
the due process rights of criminal defendants by prohibiting the employ-
ment of private prosecutors. This article will examine the arguments that
are generally made in support of private prosecutors and explain why those
arguments are not valid. This article also will discuss the duties of the public
prosecutor, the ethical obligations of the private attorney, and the conflict
of interest that results from the appointment of a privately retained attorney
to assist the public prosecutor. Finally, this article will explain that the laws
of Virginia provide insufficient safeguards to protect the due process rights
of criminal defendants and that a rule is required which prohibits the em-
ployment of private prosecutors.
II. Private Prosecutors in Jurisdictions Other Than Virginia
The private prosecutor is defined as a member of the private bar per-
mitted to prosecute a criminal case and retained by a private party with an
)interest in the outcome of that criminal case." Virginia is not the only state
that permits private attorneys to participate with the government in the
prosecution of criminal cases. The courts of Alabama, Georgia, Indiana,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin
allow privately compensated attorneys to assist in the prosecution of crimi-
nal cases in which the party compensating the attorney has an interest. 4
13. Note that many courts use the terms "specialprosecutor" and "private prosecutor"
interchangeably. However, the term'special prosecutor" is defined in Virginia as an attorney
who is appointed to act in the place of a disabled or disqualified attorney for the Common-
wealth. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-155 (Michie 2000) (setting out guidelines for the appoint-
ment of a special prosecutor when the attorney for the Commonwealth is disabled or
disqualified); discussion infra Part IV.D.
14. See Hopkins v. State, 429 So. 2d 1146, 1154 (Ala. Grim. App. 1983) (holding that'a special prosecutor's employment by the victim to represent him in a civil action arising
out of the same transaction as the criminalproceeding does not deprive the defendant of a fair
trial" and that "the fact that the attorney was employed by those interested in the prosecution
is wholly immateriaL*) (internal citations omitted); Allen v. State, 257 S.E.2d 5, 7 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1979) (holding that there is no valid objection when special prosecutor also represents
alleged victim in civil suit arising from the same incident); Brown v. State, 244 S.E.2d 68, 70
(Ga. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that there is no error when trial judge refuses to disqualify
special prosecutor because of representation of alleged victim's family in related civil action),
rev'd on other grounds, 250 S.E.2d 438 (Ga. 1978); Shuttleworth v. State, 469 N.E.2d 1210,
1217-18 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that prosecutor's prior representation of defendant's
wife in defendant's divorce proceeding did not disqualify prosecutor from criminal action for
282 [Vol. 13:2
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Other states, however, do not permit privately retained attorneys to
act as prosecutors. The Supreme Court of Colorado has held that the
participation of private prosecutors is improper and prejudicial to the
defendant." Iowa statutes prohibit attorneys from assisting in crimiial
prosecutions that are relatedto civil actions in which a recovery is sought
on the matters involved in the criminal prosecution.16 Some states, includ-
ing Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, and South
Dakota, have laws that prohibit a prosecutor from acting as counsel in civil
cases which rely on the same facts as a criminal prosecution in which the
prosecutor is involved.17 Iowa law also prohibits a prosecutor from accept
nonsupport); State v. Ray, 143 N.E.2d 484, 485 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956) (holding that no
statutory or constitutional reason exists for prohibiting private prosecutors from assisting'in
criminal prosecutions); Commonwealth v. Musto, 35 A.2d 307, 310 (Pa. 1944) (holding that
it is within the trial judge's discretion to permit private prosecutor to a ppear in criminal case);
Commonwealth v. Dunlap, 335 A.2d 364,366 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975) (holding that defendant
must show actual prejudice before private prosecutor must be disqualified), afl'd, 377 A.2d
975 (Pa. 1977); Wilson v. Wilson, 984 S.W.2d 898, 899-902 (Tenn. 1998) (declining to adopt
a rule of automatic disqualification for attorney representing party in divorce and prosecuting
criminal contempt charge against opposing party); State v. Ward, 17 A. 483, 485 (Vt. 1889)
(holding that appointment as prosecutor of attorney representing an adverse party in a related
civil suit against defendant is within the discretion of the trial judge); State v. King, 396 S.E.2d
402, 411 (W. Va. 1990) (allowing attorney who, in a related civil suit, had been appointed
guardian ad litem of alleged victim to prosecute the criminal case); Bird v. State, 45 N.W.
1126, 1126-27 (Wis. 1890) (allowing the private prosecutor to assist in criminal prosecution
so long as the private prosecutor had renounced his previous employment by the alleged
victim's father).
15. See People v. Jiminez, 528 P.2d 913, 915-16 (Colo. 1974) (prohibiting district
attorney from representing party in divorce and prosecuting criminal charge arising from
same facts). Injiminez, the Supreme Court of Colorado stated that prosecutor's conflict of
interest was patently obvious and admonished the assistant district attorney and
any others in the profession, if any there may be, who have labored under the
misconception that there is nothing wrong when a district attorney acts as
counsel for a litigant in a civil case, and prosecutes a criminal case based upon the
facts giving rise to the civil action we give warning: This court will not counte-
nance or tolerate such conduct. we condemn it.
Id. (citations omitted).
16. See State e reL Newby v. Anderson, 164 N.W. 619,619-20 (Iowa 1917) (disqualify-
ing by statute a private attorney prosecuting criminal case and representing the victim in
related civil action); State v. Jensen, 160 N.W. 832, 835-36 (Iowa 1917) (same).
17. See People v. Kidd, 81 N.E.2d 892, 895-96 (Il. 1948) (discussing Illinois statute
proscribing a prosecutor from employment in a civil case upon the same facts in a criminal
case); see also Commonwealth v. Tabor, 384 N.E.2d 190, 195-96 (Mass. 1978) (holding that
statute precluded private compensation of the district attorney or any attorney assisting him);
20011
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
ing fees for prosecuting criminal cases. North Dakota has a similar statute,
though the Supreme Court of North Dakota has declined to extend the law
to apply to a privately retained special prosecutor.19 The varied treatment
of private prosecutors and privately compensated prosecutors outside of
Virginia weakens the .argument often relied upon in support of the private
prosecutor - that private prosecutors are part of an important common law
tradition, which courts should leave undisturbed.
III. Traditional Arguments Supporting the Private Prosecutor Are Not Valid
A. The Historical Significance of the Private Prosecutor
A major argument raised in support of the right to retain private
prosecutors is that the private prosecutor is a time honored fixture of the
common law. The Supreme Court of Virginia has placed great emphasis on
the notion that the private prosecutor is part of the common law and the
right to retain one cannot be abolished absent a clear message from the
Virginia General Assembly." Accounts, including those relied upon by the
Supreme Court of Virginia, that detail the importance of the private prose-
cutor at common law rely too heavily on the historical development of
Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 70 Mass. (4 Gray) 146, 147-48 (1855) (complying with statute and
ordering new trial for defendants tried by prosecutor who had previously filed numerous
civil actions against the defendants); People v. Hillhouse, 45 N.W. 484, 485-86 (Mich. 1890)
(holding that conviction could not stand when prosecutor violated statute prohibiting
prosecutor from representing complaining witness in related replevin action); People v.
Hurst, 1 N.W. 1027, 1027-28 (Mich. 1879) (holding that once the attorney's position as
prosecutor was secured by his participation in related civil action the participation of the
attorney in the criminal action is improper); Fitzgerald v. State, 110 N.W. 676,677-78 (Neb.
1907) (discussing but not applying statute that prohibits prosecutor from representing any
party in civil suit based in the same facts as a criminal case in which the prosecutor is
involved); State v. Basham, 170 N.W.2d 238, 24142 (S.D. 1969) (holding that prosecutor
barred by statute from representing complaining witness in related civil action even though
cases were not simultaneously pending); Hosford v. Eno, 168 N.W. 764, 765 (S.D. 1918)
(holding that attorney was prevented by statute from representing defendant in civil case
related to criminal prosecution).
18. See State v. Williams, 217 N.W.2d 573, 575 (Iowa 1974) (discussing Iowa statute
prohibiting prosecutor from accepting fees for the prosecution of criminal cases).
19. See State v. Kent, 62 N.W. 631, 635 (N.D. 1895) (holding that statute prohibiting
prosecutor from accepting fees for prosecuting criminal cases did not apply to privately
retained special prosecutor).
20. See Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 22, 25-26 (Va. 1985) (discussing that




criminal prosecutions in England and too lightly on the development of
public prosecutors within the Comxrionwealth. Simply put, reliance on the
historical significance of private prosecutors is misplaced.
According to some scholars, criminal complaints were tried within the
framework of a pure adversary system in the early history of England 21
This was understood as the most effective method to bring a criminal to
justice.' The English Crown assigned prosecutors to serious criminal cases,
but the right of the victim to initiate criminal proceedings against a defen-
dant was respected well into the nineteenth century.23 Crime victims or
their families were afforded the right to hire private attorneys to prosecute
these cases.24 The argument that the private prosecutor is a right deeply
embedded in Virginia common law is less persuasive, though, once the
historical context is properly understood. England lagged behind the
Commonwealth of Virginia in establishing a public system for criminal
prosecutions. The notion of a public prosecutor did not emerge in England
until the Prosecution of Offenses Act of 1879 established the Office of
Director of Public Prosecutions." Although England did not establish a
public prosecutor's office until the nineteenth century, Virginia established
a public system to assist in the prosecution of criminal cases relatively
early.26 Virginia established the office of Attorney General in 1643 to aid
the Crown in criminal prosecutions.27 A formal system of county prosecu-
tors was established in 1711.28 To the extent that proponents of private
prosecutors rely on the historical significance of private prosecutors at
common law in England, that reliance is misplaced. Virginia's public
prosecutor system pre-dates the development of a public prosecutor's office
in England by more than 180 years. The factors that necessitated the private
prosecution of criminal cases in England did not exist in Virginia once the
Commonwealth established a county prosecutor system. When the Coin-
21. See Bessler, supra note 4, at 514.
22. Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial Process, 9 HARv. J.L. & PuB.
POL'Y 357, 359 (1986) (discussing historical development of criminal prosecutions in Eng-
land).
23. Id. at 359-60.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 360-61.





monwealth assumed responsibility for criminal prosecutions, private citizens
were no longer burdened by that responsibility. Even so, the right of a
victim to retain a private prosecutor to assist the Commonwealth in the
prosecution of criminal cases was incorporated into the common law of
Virginia.29  The Supreme Court of Virginia has refused to abolish the
common law right to retain a private prosecutor in part because the court
places too much emphasis on the history of private prosecutors in England
without recognizing that the need for private prosecutors in Virginia no
longer exists, and has not existed since the early eighteenth century.
B. Protecting the Rights of Crime Victims
Victims' rights groups present additional arguments for preserving the
right to retain private prosecutors. The victims' rights movement has
successfully supported legislation that formalizes the roles of victims within
the criminal law process. The idea behind the victims' rights movement has
been that the criminal law seems cold and impersonal and that the resolu-
tion of criminal cases often leaves victims feeling left out of the.process or
even ignored.-' As a result, the victims' rights movement has pushed for
legislation that gives victims a voice in the criminal law process. In addition,
there has been a push by these groups to buttress the informal relationship
that has always existed between prosecutors and crime victims. Corporate
"victims" and insurance companies have led the charge in protecting the
rights of victims to hire and retain expert witnesses, investigators, and
29. For early Virginia cases approving the use of private prosecutors see McCue v.
Commonwealth, 49 S.E.2d 623, 630 (Va. 1905) (CThe right of the public prosecutor to have
associated with him an attorney to assist in the prosecution is established law in this state, and
it is not a proper subject of animadversion. He is as lawfully there to assist the prosecution
as counsel for the defense to defend the prisoner; and so long as he keeps within proper
bounds he is not open to criticism before the jury."); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 30 S.E. 452,
453 (Va. 1898) (holding that the decision to allow the private prosecutor to "conduct the case,
and open and dose the argument before the jury" is within the discretion of the trial judge,
subject to the abuse of discretion standard of review); Sawyers v. Commonwealth, 13 S.E.
708, 708 (Va. 1891) (holding that appointment of the victim's attorney to aid the Common-
wealth is subject to abuse of discretion standard of review); Hopper v. Commonwealth, 47
Va. 878, 879 (1849) (holding that the prosecutor may employ a member of the bar to assist
in the prosecution of a criminal case).
30. See generally Stacy Caplow, What if Tbere is No Client?: Prosecutors as -Counselor"




attorneys to assist public prosecutors. 1  Victims' rights advocates voice
concern that the individual interests of victims are not sufficiently protected
by the public prosecutor and the criminal law system. One result is the
advocacy of a redefined role for the prosecutor as a "quasi" cdient-centered
counselor.12 Proponents of this redefined role are primarily concerned-that,
although prosecutorial discretion "traditionally enables the prosecutor to act
impartially, the exclusion of the victim has become so routine that the
victim virtually vanishes after the arrest."" The victims' rights groups seek
reforms that will secure more inclusion in criminal proceedings, and in some
cases advocate elimination of the prosecutor's obligations to the public and
to the protection of the defendant's due process rights."' These groups
envision a fundamental departure from the established law of the country.
They envision a transformation of the public prosecutor into a pure advo-
cate and representative of the crime victim." Such a change is contrary to
our entire system of criminal justice. The laws of this country are designed
to protect the due process rights of criminal defendants from the arbitrary
imposition of criminal punishments. Our system is also designed to prevent
vengeance from replacing justice. It is this concern that lends the greatest
support to the use of impartial representatives of the government as prosecu-
tors. The goal of the prosecutor "in a criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done."' This is not to say that
victims have no role in the criminal law process, only that the relationshi
between the prosecutor and the victim must remain appropriately limitea.
31. See Kirk J. Nahra, The Role of Victims in Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions,
33 AUG PROSECUTOR 28 (1999) (defending efforts of the insurance industry to assist in
prosecution of white-collar crimes).
32. Caplow, supra note 30, at 8-19.
33. Id. at 18. The article goes on to state that "[i]ndeed, judges presumably accept the
notion that the victim's case is public property and can be adjudicated without any victim
participation." Id.
34. Id. at 19.
35. See Cardenas, supra note 22, at 358 (proposing that private parties should have
standing to prosecute criminal cases); see also Robert P. Mosteller, Victims' Rights and the
United States Constitution: An Effort to Recast the Battle in Criminal Litigation, 85 GEO. L.
J. 1691 (1997) (discussing support for Victims' Rights Amendments to the United States
Constitution).
36. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (holding that defendant was entitled
to a new trial based on the cumulative effects of prosecutor's misconduct).
2001]
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The prosecutor's larger duty to the public interest precludes collapsing his
role into that of the victim's advocate.
Notwithstanding the need for impartiality in the public prosecutor's
office, the Virginia General Assembly responded to the concerns of victims'
rights groups by enacting the Crime Victim and Witness Rights Act.
Virginia Code Section 19.2-11.01 prescribes the outer limits of the obliga-
tions owed by the attorney for Commonwealth to victims of crime." The
General Assembly has determined that the official participation of crime
victims in the criminal law process should include: (1) the protection of the
victims' privacy and personal safety;38 (2) limited financial assistance;3 (3)
notice of activity related to the case involving the victim;4 (4) provisions for
presenting victim impact statements;" and (5) provision of courtroom
assistance, including the use of interpreters and protection of the victims'
address and personal information.2 There is no provision in the Crime
Victim and Witness Rights Act for the appointment of an attorney to
represent the victim, nor does the statute provide for the victim to retain an
attorney to assist the Commonwealth.
That victims have a limited role in the criminal law process is not to
say that victims have no individual redress against those who have wronged
them. The tort system provides causes of action that crime victims may
pursue instead of, or in addition to, the criminal sanctions pursued by the
government.43 Those who have been physically injured by the actions of
others may bring a cause of action for battery in civil court. A murder
victim's estate or survivors may be able to bring suit for wrongful death
against the person believed to have killed the victim. These civil causes of
iction allow plaintiffs to seek compensation from those persons who injured
them." The criminal law and the prosecutor are not concerned with indi-
vidual compensation, but in vindicating the interests of the public at large.4"
37. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-11.01 (Michie 2000) (setting out provisions of the Crime
Victim and Witness Rights Act).
38. S 19.2-11.01(A)(1).
39. § 19.2-11.01(A)(2).
40. S 19.2-11.01(A)(3 ).
41. S 19.2-11.01(A)(4).
42. S 19.2-11.01(A)(5).
43. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS S 2 (4th ed. 1971)





The civil causes of action, however, are initiated by individuals and
focus on compensation for specific injured parties.' This is the proper
domain of the private attorney and the proper mechanism for crime victims
to seek redress against their wrongdoers. Criminal law and tort law have
developed along very different paths because each has focused on different
goals.47 The separate goals of the two systems militate against permitting
private parties to stand alongside the government in the prosecution of
criminal cases. In criminal cases, prosecutors focus on vindicating the
interests of the public, but those interests are jeopardized by a prosecutor
focused on securing compensation for a particular, interested party.
IV. The Employment of Private Prosecutors Violates the Due Process Rights
of Criminal Defendants
A. The Public Prosecutor's Conflict of Interest Violates Due Process
The prosecutor's duty is distinct from the duty a private attorney owes
to an individual client. In Berger v. United States," the United States Su-
preme Court described the nature of the prosecutor's role not as an adver-
sary concerned with winning cases, but as a representative of the public
obligated to the ideal that "justice shall be done."' In 1958, the American
Bar Association Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility admon-
ished prosecutors to recognize that their role within the adversary system
must be tempered by the pledge to accomplish "one objective only, that of
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
49. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88-89 (1935) (holding that defendant was
entitled to a new trial based on the cumulative effects of prosecutor's misconduct). After
severely criticizing the conduct of the federal prosecutor at trial, the Court went on to say
that
[t]he United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.
As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may
prosecute with earnestness an. vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may
strike hard blows, he is not at librt.y to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to
refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as




impartial justice. "' The Report of the Joint Conference notes that the
prosecutor must remain unfettered by the interests of an individual."1 The
prosecutor cannot act as an attorney representing a client because his obliga-
tions run to society and defendants as well as to victims of crime.' The
prosecutor's unique role in the criminal justice system was also addressed in
the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility."3 The Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility emphasized the special duty that a prosecutor under-
takes as a representative of the whole society." This obligation to the whole
of society prevents a prosecutor from acting as a partisan advocate for an
individual victim. The prosecutor's obligations to protect the rights of the
criminal defendant are addressed by the Virginia Rules of Professional
Conduct."5 Rule 3.8 of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct states
50. rofession Responsibility: Report of theJoint Conference, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1218
(1958) (discussing the ethical responsibilities of lawyers). The conference report read
The public prosecutor cannot take as a guide for the conduct of his office the
st of an attorney appearing on behalf of an individual client. The free-
dom elsewhere wisely granted to a partisan advocacy must be severely curtailed
if the prosecutor's dutes are to be properly discharged. The public prosecutor
must recall that he occupies a dual role, being obligated on the one hand, to
furnish that adversary element essential to the informied decision of any contro-
versy, but bein possessed on the other, of important governmental powers that




53. VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-10 (1996). Ethical Consider-
ation 8-10 states:
The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate;
his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict. This special duty exists because:
(1) the prosecutor represents the sovereign and therefore should use restraint in
the discretionary exercise of governmental powers, such as in the selection of
cases to prosecute- (2) during ti the prosecutor is not only an advocate but he
also may make deZIions normally ade by an individul client, and those
affectin the public interest should be fair to all; and (3) in our system of criminal
justice the accused is to be given the benefit of all reasonab.e doubts. With
respect to evidence and witnesses, the prosecutor has responsibilities differing
from those of a lawyer in private practice: the prosecutor should make timely
disclosure to the defense if available evidence, known to him, that tends to negate
the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the punish-
ment. Further, a prosecutor should not intentionally avoid pursuit of evidence
merely because he-believes it will damage the prosecutor's case or aid the accused.
Id.
54. Id.
55. See VA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 cmt. (2000) (commenting
290 [Vol. 13:2
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that a "prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not
simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific
obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that
guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evideice." s' A public prosecutor
must remain focused on the impartial administration of justice - a goal that
is inconsistent with the single-minded focus required of the attorney repre-
senting a private party. The prosecutor occupies a "quasi-judicial" role that
is created by the duty to seek justice."7 When a prosecutor also owes a duty
to a private party, his ability to fulfill his responsibility to protect the rights
of the accused is called into question. The diverging interest in fulfilling his
public duty while pursuing the interest of his individual client creates a
conflict of interest from which the private prosecutor cannot escape. The
United States Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, and the Supreme Court of Virginia have held that a public
prosecutor's conflict of interest renders a conviction constitutionally
invalid."8 The prosecutor's conflict of interest violates the defendant's right
to a fair trial and the United States Supreme Court has suggested that this
violation cannot be subjected to harmless error analysis.59
that the office of prosecutor carries with it "specific obligations to see that the defendant is
accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided on the basis of sufficient evidence").
56. Id.
57. Id. (discussing the role of the public prosecutor).
58. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88-89 (1935) (holding that defendant was
entitled to a new trial based on the cumulative effects of prosecutor's misconduct); see also
Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709, 714 (4th Cir. 1967) (holding that prosecutor's simultaneous
representation of the defendant's wife in divorce proceeding and prosecution of defendant
for assault on wife violates the requirement of fundamental fairness assured by the Due
Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 22,
26-27 (Va. 1985) (stating that "a conflict of interest on the part of the prosecution in itself
constitutes a denial of the defendant's due process rights under art. I, 5 11 of the Constitution
of Virginia, and cannot be held harmless error").
59. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787,811-12 (1987). The
Supreme Court found that a determination of actual prejudice resulting from the use of
private prosecutors is not required. The Court explained that
A concern for actual prejudice in such circumstances misses the point, for what
is at stake is the public perception of the integrity of our criminal justice system.
uste .must satisfy teappearance of justice 'and a prosecutor with conflict-ig loyalties presents the appearance of precisey the opposite. Society's interest
in disinterested prosecution therefore would not be aequately protected by
harmless-error analysis, for such analysis would not be sensitive to tle fundamen-
tal nature of the error committed.
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B. The Private Prosecutor's Conflict of Interest Must Be Imputed to the
Public Prosecutor
The familiar description of the duty owed by an attorney to his client
is that the attorney must "represent his client zealously within the bounds
of the law."' ° This duty includes the obligation to pursue the interests of the
client and to consult the client on major decisions that impact the client's
interests.6 This duty is discussed in the Virginia Rules of Professional
Conduct, which state-that "[a] lawyer shall not intentionally prejudice or
damage a client during the course of the professional relationship."' 2 The
comments to Rule 1.3(c) state that "[a] lawyer should act with commitment
and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon
the client's behalf."' The attorney's goal is to secure the result that the
client desires. 6' Once an attorney undertakes to represent a client, the
attorney becomes the agent of the client and is not permitted to engage in
activities that prejudice the interests of the client.' When an attorney is
Id. (citations omitted).
60. VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1996). The Virginia Code
of Professional Responsibility recognized that
The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the egal sstemt i to represent his
client zealously within the bounds of the law whi in udes bisciplih.a.ry Rules
and enforceable professional regulations. The professional responsibility of a
lawyer derives from his membFership in a prolession which haas the duty of
assisting members of the public to secure and protect available legal rights and
benefits. In our government of laws and not of men each member M our society
is entitled to have his conduct judged and regula .in accordance with the law;
to seek any lawful objective through legally permissible means and to present for
adjudication any lawful claim, iss-e, or defense.
Id.
61. VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (1996). The Virginia Code
of Professional Responsibility recognized that
[iln certain areas of legal representatin not aff the merits of the cause or
substantially prejudicing te rights of the client, a wyer is entitled to make
decisions on his own. lut otherwise the authority to iake decisions is exclu-
sively that of the client and if made within the framework of the law, such
decisions are binding on his iawyer.
Id.
62. VA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3(c) (2000).
63. VA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 1.3(c) cmt. 1 (2000).
64. Id.
65. VA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 1.3 (2000).
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retained as a private prosecutor, the client's interest is that a particular
defendant be convicted.
The duties a private attorney owes to third parties do not extend much
further than discovery disdosure and the prohibition on giving the client
advice on the commission and concealment of future criminal acts.6 On the
other hand, the public prosecutor is a representative of the people and is
focused on the impartial administration of justice.67 When an attorney
representing a party who is interested in a specific outcome in a criminal
proceeding is permitted to prosecute that case, the disparate duties owed by
the private prosecutor must collide. It is this conflict of interest which
violates the defendant's due process rights.
Presently, if a private prosecutor is permitted to assist in a criminal
case, the private prosecutor must remain under the control of the public
prosecutor and may only serve with the consent of the public prosecutor."
In addition, the private prosecutor is subject to the same standards of con-
duct as the public prosecutor." The private prosecutor fills a subordinate
position within the prosecutor's office. An attorney who is permitted to
serve as a private prosecutor nevertheless takes on the obligations and
responsibilities of a public prosecutor. The conflict of interest between this
duty and the duty to the private party thus becomes a conflict of interest
which must be imputed to the public prosecutor. The private prosecutor
must act in accordance with the obligations of the public prosecutor, and
Virginia law prohibits the attorney for the Commonwealth from engaging
in the private practice of law or accepting fees for his work as a prosecutor.
Thus, the presence of a private prosecutor representing the interests of a
private party creates a conflict of interest within the office of the attorney
for the Commonwealth. The public prosecutor's conflict of interest
through the private prosecutor results in a violation of the criminal defen-
66. See VA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.4 (2000) ("In representing a
client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass,
delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal
rights of such a person.1; see also VA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1 (2000)
(stating that '(a] lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of material fact or law
to a third person; or (b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client.*).
67. VA. RULES of PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 cmt. 1 (2000).
68. See Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 22,26 (Va. 1985).
69. Id.
70. See discussion of Virginia Code S 19.2-155 infra PartIV.E.
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dant's due process rights and cannot be permitted. Restricting the scope of
participation of the private prosecutor does not alter the nature of the
conflict of interest because the private client's interests remain a factor so
long as the private prosecutor is permitted to participate in the criminal case.
C. The Courts and the Private Prosecutor
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A. 7" In Young, private attor-
neys for Louis Vuitton, a French leather goods company, were appointed
as special prosecutors by the district court to prosecute criminal contempt
charges arising from a civil suit brought by Louis Vuitton.' The defendants
were convicted and appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit."' The Second Circuit affirmed the defendants' convictions,
relying on the trial judge's determination that the conviction did not result
in injustice." The defendants then appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.7" The defendants argued that the trial court was without authority
to appoint special prosecutors.7' The majority rejected this argument,
noting that the district court's power to initiate contempt proceedings
carried with it the power to appoint private attorneys to prosecute the
contempt charges.' The Court then considered the appointment of counsel
for Louis Vuitton as special prosecutors."' The Court did not hold that
counsel acted improperly, but explained that the situation created "the
potential for private interest to influence the discharge of public duty."'
71. Young v. United States exreL Vuitton etFils S.A., 481 U.S. 787,808 (1987) (holding
that trial court has discretion to appoint attorney to prosecute contempt charges but that it
is impermissible for adverse party's attorney to prosecute criminal contempt charges arising
from related civil case).
72. Id. at 790-92.
73. United States ex reL Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. Klayminc, 780 F.2d 179, 180 (2nd Cir.
1985) (affirming defendants' criminal contempt convictions prosecuted by attorneys retained
by opposing party in civil litigation from which contempt charges arose).
74. Id. at 184. The Second Circuit noted that the trial judge is best situated to protect
against injustice and has the supervisory authority to regulate the actions of attorneys at trial
so as to ensure against injustice. Id.
75. Young, 481 U.S. at 787.
76. Id. at 793.
77. Id. at 800-01.
78. Id. at 802-09.
79. Id. at 805. The Court also found that "[t]he prosecutor is appointed solely to pursue
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The justices split on the issue of remedy. Justice Brennan favored per se
reversal of the convictions, while Justices Powell and O'Connor, as well as
Chief Justice Rehnquist, would have sent the case back to determine
whether the'appointment of counsel resulted in harmless error.'s A major-
ity of the Court expressed concern that "representation of other clients may
compromise the prosecutor's pursuit of the Government's interest.""1 The
plurality in Young avoided the constitutional issue that is presented when
a private prosecutor is involved in a criminal case. The Court ruled that
prosecution of the criminal contempt charge by the attorneys representing
an adverse party in the related civil case was impermissible. The holding
was made under the "supervisory authority" of the Court though it was
presented in language indicative of a due process decision."
Although Young is not binding on state courts, it is an important tool
in analyzing the issue of private prosecutors because the Court's analysis of
the role of the prosecutor and the conflict of interest created by private
prosecutors is consistent with the constitutional argument set out almost
twenty years previous by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in Ganger v. Peyton." The defendant in Ganger was charged with
the public interest in vindication of the court's authority. A private attorney appointed to
prosecute a criminal contempt therefore certainly should be as disinterested as a public
prosecutor who undertakes such a prosecution." Id. at 804.
80. Id. at 827.
81. Id. at 804.
.82. Id. at 809.
83. Id. Though the Court relied upon its supervisory power over the Federal courts
in holding that the convictions were invalid, the majority found that:
A prosecutor exercises considerable discretion in matters such as the determina-
tion of which rsons hould be targets of investi tion, what methods of investi-
gation should e used, what informaton willbe sought as evidence, which
persons should be charged with what offenses, which prsons should be utilized
as witnesses whether to enter into plea ba i anfthe terms on which they
will be established, and whether any indiviuals should be anted imunity.
These decisions critical to the conduct of a prosecution, are aflmade outside the
supervision of tie court.
Id. at 807. The Court determined that because the prosecutor wields such extraordinary
power attorneys representing an adverse party should not be permitted to prosecute criminal
contempt charges against the party-opponent. Id. The Court expressed concern that
prosecutions conducted by the adverse party's counsel would permit the private party's
interest to compromise the government's interest. Id. at 804.
84. Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709, 714 (4th Cir. 1967) (holding that prosecutor's
simultaneous representation of the defendant's wife in divorce proceeding and prosecution
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assault arising out of a domestic dispute."5 The defendant's wife filed for
divorce as a result of the dispute and retained the attorney for the Common-
wealth to represent her in the divorce." The same attorney for the Com-
monwealth also prosecuted the assault charge against the defendant."7
Ganger was convicted of assault and sentenced to six months in jail. The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia reversed
Ganger's conviction based on the fact that the attorney for the Common-
wealth represented the defendant's wife in the related divorce proceeding."8
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the court's reversal of the conviction."' The
Fourth Circuit placed particular emphasis on the prosecutor's self-interest
in securing a conviction.' The court noted that a conviction could affect
the amount of the attorney's fee and this could have caused the prosecutor
to foreo plea bargaining or even the decision whether to prosecute the case
at all.' The court found that representing the defendant's wife in the
divorce proceeding suggested that the attorney for the Commonwealth may
have abdicated to the client his responsibility and discretion as a representa-
tive of the public.' The Commonwealth conceded that the attorney for the
Commonwealth should not have represented the defendant's wife in the
divorce. However, the Commonwealth argued that the representation
resulted in no error in the criminal case.'3 The Fourth Circuit rejected this
contention and held that the prosecutor's conflict of interest was a per se
violation of the defendant's due process rights and required reversal of his
conviction.'
4
As Young and Ganger demonstrate, the prosecutor's conflict of interest
arises in cases in which a private party has in interest in the conviction of a
of defendant for assault on wife violates the requirement of fundamental fairness assured by
the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
85. Id. at 711.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 712-13.
88. Id. at 711-12.
89. Id. at 714-15.
90. Id. at 714.
91. Id. at 713.





particular defendant.9 The leading Virginia case on the private prosecutor's
conflict of interest is Cantrell v. Commonwealth." The defendant in
Cantrell was charged with the first-degree murder in the death of his wife. 97
The parents of the victim hired a local attorney, Carl McAfee ("McAfee"),
to assist the attorney for the Commonwealth and to "help to get [the
defendant] convicted."" McAfee was not formally appointed as a special
prosecutor by the judge, was not hired as an Assistant attorney for the
Commonwealth, was not paid by the Commonwealth, and did not take an
oath of office." However, the parents of the victim incurred fees exceeding
$10,000 related to McAfee's participation in the case.'O Cantrell was con-
victed and appealed, arguing that McAfee's participation violated Cantrell's
right to a fair trial.1"' The Supreme Court of Virginia acknowledged that
McAfee was clearly lead counsel in the case, noting that "he examined most
of the witnesses, made and responded to most of the motions and objec-
tions, and made the closing argument to the jury."" The family of the
victim in Cantrell also retained McAfee as counsel in a civil case in which
the parents of the victim sought custody of the defendant's children."3 The
defendant argued that the custody case would be facilitated by a criminal
conviction and that conviction would set the stage for a wrongful death
action, which would bar the defendant from inheriting from his deceased
95. See, e.g., Compton v. Commonwealth, 175 S.E. 879, 881-82 (Va. 1934). In Compton,
the county sheriff and county clerk employed a private prosecutor to assist the Common-
wealth in obtaining a conviction for first-degree murder. Id. The Supreme Court of Virginia
held in Comp ton that prejudice is presumed when an accused proves that the officer to whom
the jury has been committed for the purpose of guarding them against outside influence was
so interested in the verdict that he employed a private prosecutor to obtain a conviction. Id.;
see also Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967), discussed supra.
96. Cantrel v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 22,23 (Va. 1985) (holding that possibility
of prosecutor's conflict of interest rises to an overwhelming proabili when attorney
representing party in civil case is permitted to assist in the prosecution of criminal charges
arising from facts related to the civil case).
97. Id. at 23.
98. Id. at 24-25.







wife."0' The defendant argued that obtaining a criminal conviction held
such an incentive for McAfee and his civil clients that it created a conflict
of interest between McAfee's duty to zealously represent the interest of his
clients and his obligation as a prosecutor to administer justice im-partially.105
A unanimous Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the defendant's
conviction.' The court held that the likelihood that McAfee's duty to his
civil clients conflicted with his duty as a prosecutor to "seek justice, not
merely convict" rose to the level of an "overwhelming probability."07 The
court determined that the degree of control which McAfee exercised over
the criminal case and his conflicting duties to his civil clients and to the
public created a situation in which the defendant was denied his due process
right to a fair trial.'0' The court held that harmless error analysis did not
attach and that prejudice to the defendant need not be shown once a prose-
cutor's conflict of interest is established."°9
More than a decade after Cantrell, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
held that a trial judge violated a defendant's due process rights by appoint-
ing a private prosecutor retained by the victim's family to act as a special
prosecutor after the attorney for the Commonwealth withdrew from the
case. In Adkins v. Commonwealth, the Commonwealth argued that
Cantrell was distinguishable on its facts."' The Commonwealth tried to
distinguish the special prosecutor in Adkins from the private prosecutor in
Cantrell, arguing that the private attorney was never formally appointed as
a special prosecutor, had never taken an oath of office, and was not paid by
the Commonwealth."' The Commonwealth also argued that unlike the
private prosecutor in Cantrell, the special prosecutor in Adkins never
represented the victim's family in civil proceedings."' The Commonwealth
argued further that because the special prosecutor ended his representation
of the family when he was appointed as the special prosecutor in the crimi-
104. Id.
105. Id.




110. 492 S.E.2d 833 (Va. Ct. App. 1997).
111. Adlins v. Conmmonwealth, 492 S.E.2d 833,835-36 (Va. Ct. A pp. 1997) (holding that
special prosecutor's conflict of interest violated defendant's right to fair trial).




nal case, any conffict that might have once existed ceased to exist.' The
court rejected the distinctions offered by the Commonwealth."' The court
noted that the prosecutor's duty is "not merely to convict but to see that the
accused receives a fair and impartial trial.""' The Court of Appeals of
Virginia held that a special prosecutor formerly employed by the victim's
family "is incapable of exercising the fair-minded prosecutorial discretion to
which the defendant is entitled."" 7 The court placed particular emphasis on
the prior relationship with the victim's family and the ongoing obligation
that counsel incurred as the family's private attorney."' The court went on
to say that "[o]nce the private prosecutor who has been paid by the victim's
family to obtain a conviction becomes the special prosecutor with full
discretionary authority, obviously, the opportunity to give full reign to the
partiality that initially existed is unchecked."'
D. The Cantrell Framework Allows Private Parties to Co-opt the
Prosecutor's Office in Pursuit of Private Vengeance
The Supreme Court of Virginia in Cantrell relied on the common law
history of the private prosecutor right to support the continued existence
of private prosecutors. ' The court subscribed to the view that the right to
retain a private prosecutor is deeply embedded in American legal culture.12'
Instead of abolishing private prosecutors, the court fashioned a test for
reviewing the appointments of private prosecutors. " The court determined
that a private prosecutor is subject to the same standards of conduct as the
public prosecutor, and cannot advocate any position that would be forbid-







120. Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 22, 26-27 (Va. 1985).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 26.
123. Id. (citing State ex reL Moran v. Ziegler, 244 S.E.2d 550, 552-53 (W. Va. 1978)
(holding that private prosecutor must abandon the role of a partisan advocate and must be
held to the same standards as the public prosecutor)).
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role to be limited.' The right to have a private prosecutor assist the prose-
cution lies within the discretion of the trial judge. 2' The court noted that
the private prosecutor: (1) cannot initiate a criminal proceeding or appear
before the grand jury;12 (2) may only participate with the express consent
of the attorney for the Commonwealth; 27 (3) may make dosing arguments
only within. the trial court's discretion;' (4) may not participate in plea
decisions or decisions to enter a nolle prosequi; 2 and (5) must remain under
the continuous control of the public prosecutor.'" Finally, the court held
that the possibility that "private vengeance has been substituted for impartial
application of the criminal law" precludes harmless error analysis."' The
court explained that a prosecutor's conflict of interest alone results in a
denial of the defendant's due process rights.3 2 However, the court's failure
to abolish the private prosecutor leaves open the opportunity for private
prosecutors to appear in Virginia criminal cases.
The list of factors set out above limits a private prosecutor to an advi-
sory role or to limited participation at trial when that attorney also has an
interest in the outcome of a related civil case. However, exploration of
some hypothetical situations that slightly change the facts of Cantrell
demonstrates that the limitations placed on private prosecutors by the
Supreme Court of Virginia are insufficient to protect defendants from
private vengeance.
124. Id.
125. Id. (citing State v. Atkins, 261 S.E.2d 55, 58-59 (W. Va. 1979) (holding that appoint-
ment of private prosecutor is within the discretion of the trial judge)).
126. Id. (citing Nichols v. State, 87 S.E. 817,820-21 (Ga. Ct. App. 1916) (holding private
attorney may not advise grand jury and prosecute the case arising from the grand jury
indictment)).
127. Id. (citing State v. Bartlett, 74 A. 18, 19 (Me. 1909) (holding that trial court alone
has authority to appoint private attorney to act as prosecutor)).
128. Id. (citing Sawyers v. Commonwealth, 13 S.E.708, 708 (Va. 1891) (holding that
decision to allow private prosecutor to make closing argument lies within the discretion of
the trial judge)).
129. Id. (citing Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709, 712-13 (4th Cir. 1967) (holding that
private prosecutor may not participate in decisions related to plea negotiations)).
130. Id. (citing State v. Moose, 313 S.E.2d 507, 512-13 (N.C. 1984) (holding that use of
private prosecutor does not require reversal if public prosecutor retained control over the
private attorney)).




Consider the case of a criminal defendant ("defendant") charged with
capital murder and robbery in the death of his wife. The victim's family
("the family") initiates a civil wrongful death suit against defendant and
retains an attorney in the civil case ("the civil attorney"). Through this
attorney the family also files for custody of the defendant's children. The
family retains another attorney from another firm ("the private prosecutor")
who is permitted to serve as a private prosecutor in the criminal case.
Under Cantrell, the trial judge might well refuse to remove private prosecu-
tor because he does not technically represent the victim's family in the
related civil suit. The fact that the private prosecutor does not represent the
family in the civil case does not lessen the impact that the private prosecu-
tor's performance in the criminal case will have on the civil proceeding.
The private prosecutor will know that for his clients a favorable resolution
of the civil matter would be aided by success in the criminal proceeding.
This creates an incentive for the private prosecutor to fashion his strategy
in the criminal trial in the way to best facilitate a favorable result for the
client in the civil case. However, because the family is represented in the
civil case by the civil attorney it is possible for the trial judge to find no
conflict of interest for the private prosecutor.
Another conflict of interest could arise when the private prosecutor has
knowledge of witness bias through the relationship with the interested
party. The interested party wants the defendant convicted and may do or
say things to make a conviction more likely. If that takes place in the
presence of the private prosecutor, he is presented with a conflict between
his duty of loyalty to the client and his duty as a prosecutor to reveal to the
defendant exculpatory information under the doctrine of Brady v.
Maryland.. and its progeny." The Brady line of cases places an affirmative
133. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
134. Brady v. Mrland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1%3) (holding that suppression by prosecu-
tion of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of good faith or bad faith of prosecu-
tion). See, e.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 283 (1999) (holding that if a prosecutor
asserts that he complies with Brady through an open file policy, defense counsel may
reasonably rely on that file to contain all materials the State is constitutionally obligated to
disclose under Brady); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,436-37 (1995) (holding that suppressed
evidence is to be considered collectively, not item by item); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S.
667, 676 (1985) (holding that Brady's disclosure rejuirements extend to materials that,
whatever their other characteristics, may be used to impeach a witness); Giglio v. United
States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972) (holding that promise made to witness in exchange for
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obligation on the prosecutor to make known to the defendant any exculpa-
tory information.' Evidence of witness bias obtained by the private
prosecutor through the relationship with the interested party falls into this
category,'-% but the private prosecutor's duty to the client is to keep such
information secret. The private prosecutor is likely to resolve the conflict
in favor of the client andto the detriment of the defendant. Again, if the
family is represented in a civil proceeding by the civil attorney the court
might gloss over the very real conflict of interest with which the private
prosecutor is presented. Whether the private prosecutor makes strategic
decisions that advance the interested party's claim in civil court or conceals
information that should be revealed to the defendant, the Cantrell restric-
Stions do not guarantee that the defendant's due process rights will be
protected. A party who has an interest in the outcome of a criminal case
could perhaps escape Cantrell by dividing resources between private prose-
cutor and civil attorney.
E. The Virginia Code Since CantrelL Restricting the Role of the
Private Bar in Criminal Prosecutions
There is no statutory provision in the Virginia Code or the Virginia
Constitution that permits a private prosecutor to assist the attorney for the
Commonwealth. However, Virginia Code Section 19.2-155 allows the
appointment of a special prosecutor to act in place of the attorney for the
Commonwealth.'37 A special prosecutor may be appointed if: (1) the
attorney for the Commonwealth is related to the accused; (2) the trial judge
and the attorney for the Commonwealth determine that the relationship
between the accused and the attorney for the Commonwealth renders
improper the participation of the attorney for the Commonwealth in the
case; or (3) the attorney for the Commonwealth is unable to perform his
duties due to sickness, a disability, or other temporary reason."' The statute
requires that the trial judge appoint an attorney for the Commonwealth
testimony is within scope of Brady and government's nondisclosure of Brady material must
be attributed to prosecutor).
135. Seesup note 134.
136. See Carter v. Burch, 34 F.3d 257, 259-60 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that evidence of
witness bias falls within the scope of Brady).
137. See VA. CODE AM. S 19.2-155 (Michie 2000) (setting out guidelines for the





from another jurisdiction to act as special prosecutor."' Only in a few
situations is it appropriate for the judge to appoint a private attorney. The
appointment of a private attorney is allowed ony if: (1) appointment of
another attorney for the Commonwealth is inappropriate; or (2) an attorney
for the'Commonwealth or assistant is not available and good cause is
shown.10
The General Assembly amended the statute in 19964 Prior to the
1996 amendments, Section 19.2-155 authorized the appointment of, an
attorney-at-law to fill a vacancy created by a disqualified or disabled attorney
for the Commonwealth." The language of the statute prior to 1996 simply
directed the trial judge to appoint an attorney to act in place of the disabled
or disqualified attorney for the Commonwealth.4 The statute as amended
restricts the trial judge's authority to appoint members of the private bar as
special prosecutors. The new language of Section 19.2-155 demonstrates a
preference for appointing attorneys for the Commonwealth to act as prose-
cutors and signals the reluctance of the General Assembly to involve private
attorneys in the prosecution of criminal cases.'"
This statute does not authorize the appointment of an attorney to assist
the attorney for the Commonwealth. 14 Rather, it authorizes compensation
of that attorney and provides that the attorney is authorized to act in place
of the prosecutor so long as the attorney for the Commonwealth is disabled
or disqualified.'" But the authority of the trial judge to appoint a member
of the private bar as a replacement attorney for the Commonwealth has
been curtailed. The amendments to the special prosecutor statute can be
.characterized fairly as an attempt by the General Assembly to push the
private bar out of the arena of criminal prosecutions. This is important
because permitting private prosecutors to assist the Commonwealth is at
odds with the efforts of the General Assembly to limit the appointment of




142. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-155 (Michie 1975) amended as VA. CODE ANN. 5 19.2-
155 (Michie 2000).
143. Id.





Assembly would limit the appointment of a private attorney as a temporary
replacement for the attorney for the Commonwealth while condoning the
practice of permitting private attorneys to assist in criminal prosecutions.
The signal from the 1996 amendment to Section 19.2-155 is that the General
Assembly wanted to limit the participation of the private bar in criminal
prosecutions to those rare circumstances when an attorney for the Com-
monwealth is temporarily disabled or disqualified and another attorney for
the Commonwealth cannot be appointed in his place.
Virginia Code Section 15.2-1630 permits the appointment of part-time
assistant attorneys for the Commonwealth. 47 These part-time assistants are
permitted to engage in the prosecution of criminal cases while maintaining
a private practice.'" These positions are disappearing, however. In the last
two decades, the Compensation Board has continuously reduced the num-
ber of part-time assistant positions available. 4' For example, available
records indicate that in 1995 there were thirty-four positions available for
part-time assistant attorneys for the Commonwealth.'" By 2000, that
number decreased to only thirteen positions.' The Compensation Board
expects this number to be reduced even further.' Because fewer positions
are available, fewer private attorneys will prosecute criminal cases as part-
time assistant attorneys for the Commonwealth. This is another example
of the trend toward moving the private bar out of criminal prosecutions.
The steady elimination of part-time assistant attorney for Commonwealth
positions and the restrictions on appointment of private attorneys as special
prosecutors are not clear signals that the General Assembly has decided to
abolish the private prosecutor. However, there is dearly a move to separate
the private bar from the business of prosecuting criminal cases and that
move erodes support for continuing to permit private prosecutors to partici-
pate in criminal cases.
147. VA. CODE ANN. S 15.2-1630 (Michie 2000) (permitting the Compensation Board
and the local municipal government to allow part-time assistant attorneys for the Common-
wealth to continue the private practice of law).
148. Id.
149. ' E-mail from Cindy Waddell, Commonwealth Compensation Board (Mar. 20,2001,
11:35:00 EST) (on file with author). Cindy Waddell would not release the records to the







Private prosecutors cannot be justified on historical grounds or on
grounds that they provide access to justice for the otherwise disenfranchised.
Since the eighteenth century, the Commonwealth has entrusted the attor-
neys for the Commonwealth with the responsibility of conducting criminal
prosecutions. In this capacity, public prosecutors fulfill dual roles as repre-
sentatives of the people of the Commonwealth and as impartial administra-
tors of justice. The attorneys for the Commonwealth have immense power
over the life and liberty of defendants. Because the prosecutor has so much
power, it is crucial that he not be encumbered by interests that could im-
pede the detached, impartial exercise of his duties. When private attorneys
are appointed as prosecutors to assist in specific criminal cases, the public
prosecutor's office cannot escape the interests of the party that retains the
private prosecutor. Disinterested parties do not provide private prosecutors.
Parties that have interests in the outcomes of specific criminal proceedings
provide private prosecutors to ensure that the private parties' interests are
protected. Permitting interested parties to employ private attorneys to assist
in the prosecution of criminal cases results in the "overwhelming probabil-
ity" that private vengeance will supplant the prosecutor's duty to ensure the
rights of defendants." 3 The Supreme Court of Virginia recognized this in
Cantrell, but expressed unwillingness to put an end to the abuse of defen-
dants' rights at the hands of private prosecutors."5 The General Assembly
has amended the Virginia Code to move away from the appointment of
members of the private bar as special prosecutors, but has not explicitly
abrogated the common law right to retain a private prosecutor.' The
courts and the legislature are hesitant to abolish the antiquated common law
rule permitting private prosecutors. Perhaps the fear of appearing soft on
crime prevents the court and legislature from abolishing private prosecutors.
Perhaps the issue does not weigh heavily on the minds of judges and legisla-
tors. Regardless of the reasons behind the failure to abolish the private
prosecutor right, due process demands that Virginia must abolish the institu-
tion of the private prosecutor, whether through the authority of the Su-
preme Court of Virginia or the law-making power of the General Assembly.
153. Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 22, 26 (Va. 1985).
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155. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-155 (Mchie 2000).
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